PAF in Kargil : A PAF warrior speaks out

Unlike the 1965 war and 1971 war,  where impartial observers like John Fricker and Chuck Yeager lauded the role played by PAF,   PAF’s role in the Kargil war is denigrated, especially by the Pro-Army sections of the military,  for being “non-cooperative”.   Here an Airman speaks out about PAF’s role in the Kargil affair.   It is telling not just for failure of Pakistan’s war planners but also the precarious relationship between democratic institutions and military ones.  War, as Clausevitz said,  is diplomacy by another means.   There is definitely a need for an Kargil Commission in Pakistan to sort out those responsible for what turned out to be a travesty for all concerned especially as to how Pakistani military runs its affair and where the war policy is made.  We welcome comment by all concerned but especially those who are in the business of warfare and military strategy. –

PAF and the Kargil War

 

By M. Kaiser Tufail

 

While the Indians were prompt in setting up an Inquiry Commission into the Kargil fracas, we in  Pakistan  found it expedient to bury the affair in ‘national interest’.  Compared to the Indians, Pakistani writings on the Kargil conflict have been pathetically few and, those that did come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in Army quarters. Here is an on-scene airman’s perspective, focusing on IAF’s air operations and the PAF’s position.

 

Operational Planning in PAF

 

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to PAF’s appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF’s hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters are made up of four-tiered staff officers.  The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DC AS ) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VC AS ).  They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF’s ‘corporate’ decision-making body which is chaired by Chief of the Air Staff (C AS ).  The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (AC AS ) who head various sub-branches and, along with their Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required.  A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

 

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response.  During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch.  Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises.  This essentially is the gist of war preparedness methodology in the PAF.

 

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Pervez Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF.  An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy.  During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile  East Pakistanwhen his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW.  He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot’s career after repatriation and eventually rose to command PAF’s premier Sargodha Base.  He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises.  He also held the vitally important post of DC AS (Ops) as well as the VC AS before taking over as Chief of the Air Staff.

 

The post of DC AS (Ops) was held by Air Marshal Zahid Anis (late).  A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments.  These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders’ School and PAF Base,  Sargodha .  He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of Operations branch at the Air Headquarters.  He had done his Air War Course at the PAF’s  Air  War  College, another War Course at the  French  War  College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in  UK .

 

The AC AS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali.  He had earlier done his War Course from the  French  War  College .   The AC AS (Plans) was Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz (late), a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the  Staff  College at  Bracknell ,   UK  and during his War Course at the  National  Defence  College,  Islamabad .

 

There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF’s hierarchy was highly qualified and each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience.  The three top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First Rumblings

 

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), the first occasion when I got an opportunity to interact with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999.  Brig Nadeem Taj called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me.  He wanted to know when did the PAF last carry out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc.  Rather impressed with the Army’s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details.  Next day, Brig Taj again called, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc.  He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses.  We got on a secure line and I passed the required information.  Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing.  In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DC AS (Ops).  Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who also had the same to say as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.

 

Not withstanding the DGMO’s assurance, a cautious Air Marshal Zahid decided to check things for himself and despatched Gp Capt Tariq Ashraf, Officer Commanding of No 33 Wing at PAF Base, Kamra, to look things over at Skardu and make a report.  Within a few days, Gp Capt Tariq (who was also the designated war-time Commander of Skardu Base) had completed his visit, which included his own periodic war-readiness inspection.  While he made a detailed report to the DC AS (Ops), he let me in on the Army’s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen in Skardu.  His analysis was that ‘something big is imminent.’  Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high.  Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city.  Interestingly, Messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers.  In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs many weeks before the operation unfolded.

 

 After hearing Gp Capt Tariq’s report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army’s ongoing review of contingency plans required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion.  Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to ‘Kashmir Contingency’.

 

Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DC AS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in  Kashmir ‘ at HQ 10 Corps.  We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room.  Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflaged scarf, cutting an  impressive figure.  After exchange of pleasantries, the COSstarted with the map orientation briefing.  Thereafter Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier.  It was nothing more than a ‘protective manoeuvre’, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC).  He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the  Dras-Kargil Road .  These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy.  Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes.  The target was a vulnerable section ofDras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector.  He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by IAF.  “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute.  It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks.  (The oft-heard strategic aim of ‘providing a fillip to the insurgency in  Kashmir ‘ was never mentioned.)

 

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring the type of air support that might be needed for the operation.  Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened.  “I have Stingers on every peak,” he announced.  Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude.  To this, Lt Gen Mehmud’s reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air.  As the discussion got more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint.  He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow positioning of hundreds of guns that were required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained.  He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to vulnerability of the vital road link to our offensive elements. 

It seemed from the Corps Commander’s smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design.  More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners’ minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander’s elucidation. 

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, “After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!” as we walked out of the briefing room.

 

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DC AS (Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing.  His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern over the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour.  We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with.  Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DC AS (Ops) went to brief the C AS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine.  The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.

IAF – By Fits & Starts

 

IAF deployments in  Kashmir , for what came to be known as ‘Operation Safedsagar’, commenced on 15 May and the bulk of operational assets were positioned by 18 May.  150 combat aircraft were deployed, as follows:

Srinagar         34   (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)

Awantipur     28   (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)

Udhampur    12   (MiG-21)

Pathankot      30   (MiG-21, MiG-23)

Adampur       46   (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)

One-third of the aircraft were modern, ‘high-threat’ fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out at a local air-to-ground firing range.

 

Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC.  Strafing and rocketing of intruders’ positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 was the salient feature of this initial phase. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army SAMs, while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting ‘interrogation’ session.)

The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal.  Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud’s rant about a ‘Stinger on every peak’ seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis’ glee.

 

The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution.  In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded accuracy. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led them to be even more cautious.

 

By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 ‘technical violations’ (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently ‘cocked-a-snoot’ at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.

 

The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable by Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.

 

The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions which totalled about 150. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.

 

While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air Joint Operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.

PAF in a Bind

 

From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif by PAF’s Chief of Air Staff in no equivocal terms.

 

Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najeeb Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najeeb, who had an excellent knowledge about own and enemy’s Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE), focused on fighter sweep as a possible option. To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or Northern Areas.  That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in own territory but fell across, providing a pretext to  India  as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which unfavourably impinged on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1^st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible.  A fighter sweep thus came to be a non-starter.

 

While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF’s minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence, in so far as no bombing took place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting.  There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The matter was taken up by the GHQ with AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and  Sargodha . This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a secondary turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location.

 

F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing  US  sanctions.  Random CAPs were resorted to with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station.  There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place.  After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and the activity had to be ‘rationalised’, a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the minds of the Air Staff was evident in the decision by the DC AS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening. 

Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of lack of cooperation by the PAF.  Suffice to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass.  Now, it was almost as if PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.

 

It also must be highlighted that other than the F-16s, PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement

in the scenario under discussion was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. The F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the Mirage-III/5 were sitting ducks for the air combat mission (even though an odd squadron had been retrofitted with a first-class radar which made it fit for the night interceptor role).

 In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, PAF gave no pretext to the enemy for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army which were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike to some that PAF’s restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?

Aftermath

 

It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the CO AS : General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt General Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas: Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be suckered by the chicanery.  It fell to the half-wit of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio’s self-serving presentation. “General sahib, bismillah karen…” is how he is supposed to have given the go ahead, not withstanding the denials he keeps issuing every solar eclipse.

 

In an effort to keep the plan secret – which was the key to its successful initiation, so it was thought – the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders, nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:

 

Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.

 

Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.

 

Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly ‘capture’ territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.

 

Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.

 

Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.

 

The flaws in the Kargil Plan that lead to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman’s attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little cheek for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is this fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.

 

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture which accommodates different points of view, a more lateral approach, so to speak. Dissent should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront.

 

Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, a precocious alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.  Kargil, I suspect, like ’65 and ’71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in preclusion of potential disasters.

Tailpiece

 

An unfortunate aside to the Kargil episode was the perceived ‘non-cooperation’ of the PAF which was not forgotten by the CO AS , who decided to square up after he landed himself in the chair of Pakistan’s President.  Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff, Gen Musharraf struck at PAF’s top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks back.  Not pleased by Air Chief Marshal Mehdi’s rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior Gen Musharraf, the latter got an opportunity to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could treat like one of the Corps Commanders. (It is another matter that Air Chief Marshal Mus’haf turned out as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF’s interests.) It was unfortunate that PAF’s precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and careers destroyed, all due to one man’s rancour. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.

 

  The author is a retired Air Commodore.