The Civil Society Movement in Pakistan: Scope and Limitation

Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed

In the transition from an increasingly authoritarian regime headed by President Pervez Musharraf to an elected coalition government headed by Mr Yousaf Raza Gilani of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the civil society in Pakistan has been acclaimed as the spearhead that wrought such transformation.

Popular movements against dictatorship naturally gain momentum when large sections of the society join them, but normally oppositional political parties and their leaders lead them. In Pakistan, however, the anti-Musharraf movement developed spontaneously among the lawyers in early March 2007 and, gradually, human rights and women rights non-government organisations (NGOs) joined it, while the main political parties remained aloof till sometimes in late October 2007.

In this brief review, we shall try to solve the puzzle of why civil society actors, and not the political parties, assumed the role of the democratic movement in Pakistan. In this regard, we shall address the following questions: What is a civil society? What is its connection to democracy? What did the Pakistan civil society do to bring about the change from authoritarianism to democracy? What is the scope and limitations of the civil society movement that has evolved in Pakistan?

In a broad sense, a modern polity is constituted by three components: one, the state and its institutions; two, the political society comprising political parties and their affiliates; and three, a civil society which comprises autonomous and voluntary organisations that are distinct from state institutions and political organisations. One can include, among them, independent newspapers, television and radio channels, trade unions, chambers of commerce, various interest groups, religious organisations, NGOs and charitable institutions, among others. The assumption is that, if all three function according to the rules of the game, they complement each other and, therefore, establish a democratic dispensation where power is not concentrated massively with only one component.

However, in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the political opposition is usually repressed and, therefore, challenges to the power of the state have to emanate in a civil society. Classically, in the absence of any meaningful oppositional political party, the Roman Catholic Church and the anti-communist trade union leaders at Gdansk became the leaders of the movement for democracy in Poland against the dictatorship of the ruling Communist Party. Equally, because of the ruthless suppression of the political opposition in Iran, only the Shia clergy could mobilise mass opposition to the Shah of Iran. In this latter case, instead of the civil society establishing democracy, a theocratic dictatorship was installed. Therefore, there is no direct one-to-one relationship between a civil society-led movement against dictatorship and the triumph of democracy. It can even result in a much worse type of autocratic rule.

In light of such theoretical considerations, if we now examine the Pakistan situation, we find that Mr Musharraf’s government was generally considered an authoritarian regime as he had come to power by overthrowing the elected government of Mr Nawaz Sharif in October 1999. Mr Musharraf tried to promote his regime as a progressive one in opposition to the Islamists, claiming that he wanted to introduce a moderate and democratic version of Islam. However, he began to face mounting opposition, including terrorist attacks and assassination attempts by extremist Muslims, after he decided that Pakistan should join the United States-led “war on terror” in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

During that period, some left leaning parties and civil society actors such as liberal newspapers and human rights and women rights NGOs tended to support Mr Musharraf because they considered him a counterweight to militant and violent Islamism. Over time, however, they became less and less convinced that he wanted seriously to promote a moderate version of Islam consistent with democracy and human rights. Instead, he was seen as an opportunist who could not take a clear stand against the Islamists.

It was in these circumstances that when, on 9 March 2007, Mr Musharraf, in a most clumsy and arrogant manner, declared Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry of the Pakistan Supreme Court non-functional (a novel term meaning practically removed from his office) on allegations of misuse of office, it was received with dismay by many sections of the Pakistani society. It was widely believed that Justice Chaudhry had told Mr Musharraf that he could not contest elections while remaining in uniform, and that the election as president had to be carried out before the end of 2007. Moreover, he took up several habeas corpus cases of Pakistani citizens, mainly critical journalists and political activists, abducted by the security forces, ordering that the detained individuals should be produced in court. Justice Chaudhry refused to accept Mr Musharraf’s arbitrary verdict because the relevant due process for removing sitting judges had not been followed. When he tried to enter the premises of the Supreme Court, he was manhandled by security and intelligence officials. This could be seen on television channels. Not surprisingly, the Pakistani people were shocked and dismayed.

It was also not surprisingly that the lawyers were the first who took to the streets to protest the public humiliation meted out to the senior most member of the legal fraternity. Pakistani newspapers and television channels also became involved in ventilating condemnation of the highhanded behaviour of the Musharraf regime. Over the months, demonstrations and protest actions continued in the premises of the courts despite violent assaults by the police and security agencies. Mr Aitizaz Ahsan, a leading lawyer and a stalwart of the PPP of Ms Benazir Bhutto, and some other leading lawyers became the leaders of that movement.

The two main opposition political parties, the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) of Mr Sharif were initially hesitant to take part in that movement and it was the lawyers who continued their protests. Both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif were, at that time, living in exile and it seems they were not sure what benefit could be drawn by jumping head-on into such a movement. Both followed a highly personal type of leadership model and, therefore, were wary of a mass movement bringing forth new leaders.

In any event, Justice Chaudhry was re-instated on 10 July 2008 by a Supreme Court bench. However, that did not mean that the standoff between Mr Musharraf and him ended. Rather, Justice Chaudhry embarked upon judicial activism that clearly sought confrontation with Mr Musharraf. Meanwhile, calls for Mr Musharraf to step down and for a caretaker government to hold free and fair elections were being made by many people and the mass media. The crisis deepened dramatically when Ms Bhutto (18 October 2007) and Mr Sharif (27 November 2007) returned to Pakistan. Mr Musharraf had been under intense pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, respectively, to allow them to return. Their arrival set in motion not only popular rallies but also bomb blasts.

In desperation, Mr Musharraf imposed a state of emergency on 3 November 2007, mass arrests were ordered and not only Justice Chaudhry but also other judges of the supreme court that he believed were planning to unseat him as president were removed and handpicked judges were placed in their stead. General elections were due on 8 January 2008, but on 27 December 2007, Ms Bhutto was assassinated after she had addressed a public meeting. That brought forth countrywide protests, which, in some cases, turned violent. For a while, it seemed that a civil war could start. The Pakistan Election Commission postponed the elections till 18 February 2008. On 22 January 2008, some unusual members of the civil society, 100 ex-servicemen, including the highest level officers from the army, navy and air force, issued a statement demanding that Mr Musharraf should step down and democracy be restored in Pakistan It was clear that Mr Musharraf’s popularity had plummeted drastically and his support base was fast eroding. Yet, he persisted in remaining president.

The 18 February 2008 general elections proved to be a massive protest vote against authoritarianism. The PPP and the PML-N emerged as the main winners. On 22 March 2008, Mr Gilani was nominated as the PPP candidate for prime minister. He was elected prime minister on 24 March 2008. Initially, both the PPP and PML-N and other smaller parties formed a coalition government, but later the PML-N withdrew because both could not agree on how to deal with the problem of the deposed judges and the future position of Mr Musharraf who continued to be the president of Pakistan.

Thus while an elected government had come into being, the main demand of the lawyers that the deposed chief justice and other judges should be restituted was not achieved. Under the circumstance, the lawyers decided to continue agitating until they had achieved their objective. Consequently, a long march took place when lawyers from all parts of Pakistan converged in Islamabad on 11 June 2008. Although the PPP-led government allowed the protestors to carry out their protest, the deadlock between the PPP and the PML-N over how to resolve the issue of restoration of judges and the constitutional role of then-President Musharraf remained intact. In fact, Mr Ahsan had to face considerable criticism for calling off the agitation without getting the deposed judges restored to their jobs.

Thus we can see that the Pakistan civil society, more specifically the lawyers, played an effective role in setting in motion a popular struggle against authoritarianism, but after an elected government came to power, its ability to compel it to follow its agenda of restoring the deposed judges weakened. The reason for this is that, if political parties with mass followings, especially those in power, as the PPP is in Pakistan, do not support civil society democratic initiatives, then the civil society alone cannot achieve such goals.

Thus ironically, during periods of dictatorship, the scope for the civil society to take up political initiatives expand if political parties are suppressed, but contract if a democratic government enjoying mass support is in power and the political parties are not willing to throw their full support behind the demands of civil society actors for specific issues such as the restoration of the judges.

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The writer is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at ISAS, NUS, Singapore

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