(In wake of the national debate on ideology and textbooks, Mr. Raza Rumi, the founder and editor of Pakteahouse, recently asked me to revisit the issue of Jinnah’s secularism through a comprehensive blog-post. This blog post is written for PTH exclusively and may be reproduced by giving PTH credit.)
Many people (though not all) on all sides of the ideology divide in Pakistan take umbrage with the description of Mahomed Ali Jinnah – the anglicized founder of Pakistan- as a secular leader or a secularist. Islamists in Pakistan say that he wanted an Islamic state. Islamic modernists say he wanted a modern Islamic democratic state (whatever that means), some people from the left say he was a communalist who was not secular because he championed Muslim separatism (albeit only in the last 11 years of his life). All of these groups agree that if Jinnah had been secular, it would not have been necessary to make a separate state. All of them – unconvincingly and inaccurately- claim that those who lay claim to a secular Jinnah are basing it on a solitary speech of Jinnah made on 11 August 1947. A slightly different claim is made by the Wali Khan group- which is ideologically consistent if historically errant- which claims that Jinnah wanted a secular state and that his push for Pakistan was the result of British manipulation and divide and rule which made him utilize Islamist rhetoric for the creation of Pakistan. While respecting all these points of view, I disagree with all of them and through this article I will explain why.
I have argued repeatedly and I stick by the position that Jinnah wanted a state that can only be described in modern parlance as a secular democratic state. My claim is not based on 11 August 1947 alone and in fact I will go as far as to say that Jinnah’s vision of the state would have been secular even if he had not made that extraordinary pronouncement where he merely put it in black and white.
My claim is based on all of the following:
- Jinnah’s record as a legislator in the central Indian legislature spanning over four decades.
- Jinnah’s role in the Indian Independence movement and in trying to forge a united Indian nationality which earned him the title of “Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity”.
- Jinnah’s record after he took over the Muslim League as its president.
- Jinnah’s clear pronouncements as the Governor General and the first president of the constituent assembly.
- The symbolism deployed by Jinnah in his choice of his cabinet.
Record as a legislator and a leader of the Indian Independence Movement:
Jinnah started his political career as a liberal nationalist and a moderate in Indian National Congress in 1906. His opposition to the Muslim delegation’s demands in 1906 placed before Lord Minto is well known and documented. He opposed initially the separate electorate in principle as being divisive only to reconcile later with it as a necessary and temporary evil which would be dispensed with in due course. For a detailed discussion on Jinnah’s politics I encourage everyone to read “Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity” by Ian Bryant Wells, probably the best book written on Jinnah’s early politics – which should serve as a prequel to Dr. Ayesha Jalal’s brilliant “Sole Spokesman. Together these two form the essential “Jinnah reader”.
What is not well known is that after the acceptance of the separate electorate principle by the British government, Jinnah tried to move an amendment allowing non-Muslim candidates on Muslim seats arguing forcefully that the Muslim electorate should not be deprived of quality candidates just because of their faith. In other words Jinnah argued – without contradiction – that non-Muslims could represent Muslims and Muslim interests as well as any Muslim. Much later in his life he proved exactly that by appointing a Scheduled Case Hindu on a Muslim League seat.
As a legislator, Jinnah always put progress above faith. In1912, Jinnah alienated many of his Muslim supporters by giving his wholehearted support to the Special Marriage Amendment Bill, which sought to provide mixed religion marriages legal protection. He argued that the bill would provide equality but he was opposed by many members on the grounds that the bill contravened the Koran. Undaunted Jinnah asked the law member who had opposed the bill if he “would deny that there is a certain class of educated and enlightened people who rightly think that a gravest injustice is done to them as long as liberty of conscience is held from them”.
This was a position through out his life believe it or not. Rubbishing the idea that Muslim sensibilities would be hurt, he asked:
“Is this the first time in the history of legislation in this country that this Council has been called upon to override Musalman Law or modify it to suit the time? The Council has over ridden and modified the Musalman law in many respects.”
[An aside: This is a very important issue not that personal choices are relevant. It also lends us an important insight into Jinnah and debunks another myth. Many Pakistan ideology and Islam-hawks in Pakistan claim that Jinnah objected to his daughter’s marriage to a parsi on grounds of faith. This is only partially true. If Jinnah was all bothered about faith, he would not have ensured that his daughter grew up in a British boarding school and learned in British (not Muslim culture). If Jinnah’s anglicization was deliberate, his daughter is in very real terms English and there is absolutely no indication in Jinnah’s life that he tried to have his daughter schooled in religious dogma. His objection to his daughter’s marriage was on legal grounds. The law in India did not allow interfaith marriage unless one of the spouses converted to the other faith or both renounced their faith. For a leader and politician waging the battle for Muslim community interests, and increasingly a target of Mullahs already questioning his lifestyle and his minority Shia faith, this would have been embarrassing.]
In 1919 Jinnah gave evidence before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Reform Bill. The following views were expressed by him in answer to questions put by members of the Committee on the Hindu-Muslim question. This is as clear a representation of Jinnah’s life long belief in secularism as any:
EXAMINED BY MAJOR ORMSBY-GORE.Q. 3806.—You appear on behalf of the Moslem League— that is, on behalf of the only widely extended Mohammedan organisation in India ?—Yes.
Q. 3807.—I was very much struck by the fact that neither in your answers to the questions nor in your opening speech this morning did you make any reference to the special interest of the Mohammedans in India: is that because you did not wish to say anything ?—No, but because I take it the Southborough Committee have accepted that, and I left it to the members of the Committee to put any questions they wanted to. I took a very prominent part in the settlement of Lucknow. I was representing the Musalmans on that occasion.
Q. 3809.—On behalf of the All-India Moslem League, you ask this Committee to reject the proposal of the Government of India?—I am authorised to say that—to ask you to reject the proposal of the Government of India with regard to Bengal [i.e., to give the Bengal Muslims more representation than was given them by the Lucknow Pact].
Q. 3810.—You said you spoke from the point of view of India. You speak really as an Indian Nationalist ?—I do.
Q. 3811.—Holding that view, do you contemplate the early disappearance of separate communal representation of the Mohammedan community ?—I think so.
Q. 3812.—That is to say, at the earliest possible moment you wish to do away in political life with any distinction between Mohammedans and Hindus ?—Yes. Nothing will please me more than when that day comes.
Q. 3813—You do not think it is true to say that the Mohammedans of India have many special political interests not merely in India but outside India, which they are always particularly anxious to press as a distinct Mohammedan community? —There are two things. In India the Mohammedans have very few things really which you can call matters of special interest for them—I mean secular things.
Q. 3814.—I am only referring to them, of course.—And therefore that is why I really hope and expect that the day is not very far distant when these separate electorates will disappear.
Q. 3815.—It is true, at the same time, that the Mohammedans in India take a special interest in the foreign policy of the Government of India ?—They do; a very.—No, because what you propose to do is to frame very keen interest and the large majority of them hold very strong sentiments and very strong views.
Q. 3816.—Is that one of the reasons why you, speaking on behalf of the Mohammedan community, are so anxious to get the Government of India more responsible to an electorate ?—No.
Q. 3817.—Do you think it is possible, consistently with remaining in the British Empire, for India to have one foreign policy and for His Majesty, as advised by his Ministers in London, to have another ?—Let me make it clear. It is not a question of foreign policy at all. What the Moslems of India feel is that it is a very difficult position for them. Spiritually, the Sultan or the Khalif is their head.
Q. 3818.—Of one community ?—Of the Sunni sect, but that is the largest; it is in an overwhelming majority all over India. The Khalif is the only rightful custodian of the Holy Places according to our view, and nobody else has a right. What the Moslems feel very keenly is this, that the Holy Places should not be severed from the Ottoman Empire— that they should remain with the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan.
Q. 3819.—I do not want to get away from the Reform Bill on to foreign policy.—1 say it has nothing to do with foreign policy. Your point is whether in India the Muslims will adopt a certain attitude with regard to foreign policy in matters concerning Moslems all over the world.
Q. 3820.—My point is, are they seeking for some control over the Central Government in order to impress their views on foreign policy on the Government of India ?—No.
EXAMINED BY MR. BENNETT
Q. 3853.—. . . .Would it not be an advantage in the case of an occurrence of that kind [i.e., a communal riot] if the maintenance of law and order were left with the executive side of the Government ?—1 do not think so, if you ask me, but I do not want to go into unpleasant matters, as you say.
Q. 3854.—It is with no desire to bring up old troubles that I ask the question ; I would like to forget them.—If you ask me, very often these riots are based on some misunderstanding, and it is because the police have taken one side or the other, and that has enraged one side or the other. I know very well that in the Indian States you hardly ever hear of any Hindu-Mohammedan riots, and I do not mind telling the Committee, without mentioning the name, that I happened to ask one of the ruling Princes, “How do you account for this?” and he told me, “As soon as there is some trouble we have invariably traced it to the police, through the police taking one side or the other, and the only remedy we have found is that as soon as we come to know we move that police officer from that place, and there is an end of it.”
Q. 3855.—That is [a] useful piece of information, but the fact remains that these riots have been inter-racial, Hindu on the one side and Mohammedan on the other. Would it be an advantage at a time like that [that] the Minister, the representative of one community or the other, should be in charge of the maintenance of law and order ?—Certainly.
Q. 3856.—It would ?—If I thought otherwise I should be casting a reflection on myself. If I was the Minister, I would make bold to say that nothing would weigh with me except justice, and what is right.
Q. 3857.—I can understand that you would do more than justice to the other side; but even then, there is what might be called the subjective side. It is not only that there is impartiality, but there is the view which may be entertained by the public, who may harbour some feeling of suspicion?—With regard to one section or the other, you mean they would feel that an injustice was done to them, or that justice would not be done?
Q. 3858.—Yes; that is quite apart from the objective part of it.—My answer is this: That these difficulties are fast disappearing. Even recently, in the whole district of Thana, Bombay, every officer was an Indian officer from top to bottom, and I do not think there was a single Mohammedan—they were all Hindus—and I never heard any complaint. Recently that has been so. I quite agree with you that ten years ago there was that feeling what you are now suggesting to me, but it is fast disappearing.
EXAMINED BY LORD ISLINGTON
Q. 3892.—. . . .You said just now about the communal representation, I think in answer to Major Ormsby-Gore, that you hope in a very few years you would be able to extinguish communal representation, which was at present proposed to be established and is established in order that Mahommedans may have their representation with Hindus. You said you desired to see that. How soon do you think that happy state of affairs is likely to be realized?—1 can only give you certain facts: I cannot say anything more than that: I can give you this which will give you some idea: that in 1913, at the All-India Moslem League sessions at Agra, we put this matter to the lest whether separate electorates should be insisted upon or not by the Mussalmans, and we got a division, and that division is based upon Provinces; only a certain number of votes represent each Province, and the division came to 40 in favour of doing away with the separate electorate, and 80 odd—1 do not remember the exact number—were for keeping the separate electorate. That was in 1913. Since then I have had many opportunities of discussing this matter with various Mussulman leaders; and they are changing their angle of vision with regard to this matter. I cannot give you the period, but I think it cannot last very long. Perhaps the next inquiry may hear something about it.
Q. 3893.—You think at the next inquiry the Mahommedans will ask to be absorbed into the whole?—Yes, I think the next inquiry will probably hear something about it. 
Leader of the Muslim League and the Governor General of Pakistan:
The great paradox for Pakistan’s imagined Islamic nationhood is that had Jinnah not adopted a secular – i.e. non-theological- policy- he would have never managed to bring all Muslims together on one platform. The doctrinal differences between Muslims were far too great to make for any real unity. Nor was Islamic rhetoric or Muslim unity alone able to bring the Muslims marching behind the Muslim League. The painful and long process by which Jinnah forged an apparent unity is indicative of his masterful political skill. What Jinnah wanted has been long a subject of controversy but there is abundant evidence that Jinnah did not want a complete separation or partition.
The classic consociationalist theory Jinnah put forth was to secure adequate and effective representation for Muslims, having seen in close quarters the sidelining of the League in UP despite being the largest Muslim party there. Therefore Jinnah’s lawyerly arguments — a regurgitation of a small pamphlet called “Confederacy of India” (originally named Pakistan but changed at Jinnah’s insistence) by “a Punjabi” called Kifayet Ali- as he placed them in front of the League in his famous 23 March 1940 address cannot by any stretch of imagination be used to argue that he wanted an Islamic state. I strongly recommend K K Aziz’s long essay (including an interview with Kifayet Ali) on “Confederacy of India” which can be found in his short works published by Vanguard Books. In any event the Lahore Resolution did not refer to “Islam” or “Islamic state” even once. This is significant for a resolution that was imagining a different country. At the very least it was clear that there was no one fixed vision of Pakistan that the League agreed on.
The very call for national – instead of territorial- right of self determination indicated a national compact between communities and was not a clarion call for an Islamic utopia. His objective was a political space where Muslims were not limited by their faith which to Jinnah was a significant accident of birth. Ironically, that is precisely what Pakistan has been doing for the last 30 odd years.
Raja of Mahmudabad’s evidence is significant. The Raja started off by saying that since the Lahore resolution had been passed earlier that year, if and when Pakistan was formed, it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunna and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.
Jinnah’s appeal to Islam was entirely ambiguous and never concrete. In fact he always very conveniently managed to sideline the issue of Sharia, especially in 1943 when a bunch of Muslim Leaguers tried to pass off a resolution to commit Pakistan to Islam. Jinnah vetoed it and called it a censure on every Muslim Leaguer. 
On 21st May, 1947, Jinnah described clearly what kind of state he envisaged in Pakistan:
The basis of the central administration of Pakistan and that of the units to be set up will be decided no doubt, by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. But the Government of Pakistan can only be a popular representative and democratic form of Government. Its Parliament and Cabinet responsible to the Parliament will both be finally responsible to the electorate and the people in general without any distinction of caste, creed or sect, which will the final deciding factor with regard to the policy and programme of the Government that may be adopted from time to time… The minorities in Pakistan will be the citizens of Pakistan and enjoy all the rights, privileges and obligations of citizenship without any distinction of caste creed or sect. They will be treated justly and fairly. The Government will run the administration and control the legislative measures by its Parliament, and the collective conscience of the Parliament itself will be a guarantee that the minorities need not have any apprehension of any injustice being done to them. Over and above that there will be provisions for the protection and safeguard of the minorities which in my opinion must be embodied in the constitution itself. And this will leave no doubt as to the fundamental rights of the citizens, protection of religion and faith of every section, freedom of thought and protection of their cultural and social life. 
In an interview with Duncan Hooper he said:
Minorities DO NOT cease to be citizens. Minorities living in Pakistan or Hindustan do not cease to be citizens of their respective states by virtue of their belonging to particular faith, religion or race. I have repeatedly made it clear, especially in my opening speech to the constituent assembly, that the minorities in Pakistan would be treated as our citizens and will enjoy all the rights as any other community. Pakistan SHALL pursue this policy and do all it can to create a sense of security and confidence in the Non-Muslim minorities of Pakistan. We do not prescribe any school boy tests for their loyalty. We shall not say to any Hindu citizen of Pakistan ‘if there was war would you shoot a Hindu?’
In his address to the people of the United States of America, Jinnah said:
In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State — to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non- Muslims — Hindus, Christians, and Parsis — but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.
Speaking to Parsi gathering in Karachi in February 1948, he said:
I assure you Pakistan means to stand by its oft repeated promises of according equal rights to all its nationals irrespective of their caste or creed. Pakistan which symbolizes the aspirations of a nation that found it self to be a minority in the Indian subcontinent cannot be unmindful of minorities within its own borders. It is a pity that the fairname of Karachi was sullied by the sudden outburst of communal frenzy last month and I can’t find words strong enough to condemn the action of those who are responsible. 
On 22nd March 1948, meeting with Hindu Legislators in an effort to stem their exodus to India, he said:
We guarantee equal rights to all citizens of Pakistan. Hindus should in spirit and action wholeheartedly co-operate with the Government and its various branches as Pakistanis. 
On 23rd March 1948 meeting the ‘Scheduled Caste Federation’, he said:
We stand by our declarations that members of every community will be treated as citizens of Pakistan with equal rights and privileges and obligations and that Minorities will be safeguarded and protected.
Speaking to Quetta Parsis in June 1948, he said:
Although you have not struck the note of your needs and requirements as a community but it is the policy of my Government and myself that every member of every community irrespective of caste color, creed or race shall be fully protected with regard to his life, property and honor. I reiterate to you that you like all minorities will be treated as equal citizens with your rights and obligations provided you are loyal to Pakistan. 
Symbolism was also very important. As mentioned earlier, Jogindranath Mandal, a Scheduled Caste federation politician and lawyer from Bengal, was first appointed on League’s behalf to represent Muslims of India in the interim government. After partition he was nominated by Jinnah to chair the inaugural session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. He was then nominated to the first cabinet as Pakistan’s first law minister. This is a very significant fact. If Pakistan was to be an Islamic state, why was a Hindu being appointed the minister of law? Jogindranath Mandal was not only a scheduled caste Hindu but he was entirely unversed in Islamic law (unlike Rana Bhagwandas). Another significant thing was Jinnah’s decision to get a Hindu to write Pakistan’s first national anthem. This was done presumably to show that Pakistan was not exclusivist state for Muslims alone.
Jinnah’s “Islamic” rhetoric and a Secular Pakistan
Jinnah’s references to Islam were – contrary to the tall claims made by those Ulema who ironically had the time opposed the creation of Pakistan- few and far between. It was usually an Eid message or a speech at convocation where Jinnah referred to Islam. Three such quotes that these Ulema bring up include Jinnah’s speech on the occasion of Eid Milad un Nabi, his letter to Pir of Manki Sharif and his alleged speech in Peshawar’s Islamia College.
Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. Islam has taught Equality, Justice and fairplay to everybody. What reason is there for anyone to fear. Democracy, equality, freedom on the highest sense of integrity and on the basis of fairplay and justice for everyone. Let us make the constitution of Pakistan. We will make it and we will show it to the world. Islam is not only a set of rituals, traditions and spiritual doctrines. Islam is also a code for every Muslim, which regulates his life and conduct in even politics and economics and the like. 
The latter part is quoted out of context to prove that Jinnah did not want a secular state, when a closer reading shows that this is erroneous. Take the example of Keith Ellison, the Muslim Congressman in the United States. He is a practicing religious Muslim. For him Islam is a code of conduct. He is also a member of the Congress of United States of America and a patriotic American. His life and conduct in politics and economics are all regulated by his adherence to Islam. Jinnah’s opposite number in the Congress Party, Maulana Azad, was another example of an extremely conservative Muslim whose every action was driven by and regulated by Islam. In contrast Jinnah himself had a very liberal understanding of the code of Islam – if indeed he followed it. The point is that Jinnah’s reference to code for every Muslim was on a personal level. It does not speak of a state or any other thing like that. How then can this statement be taken to mean that Pakistan would be an Islamic state or a theocracy especially when read together with other speeches and statements quoted above? It also bears remembering that whenever Jinnah spoke of “Islamic principles” he qualified the statement with “democracy”, “equality”, “fairplay”, “brotherhood of man” and “social justice”.
Another often quoted example is Jinnah’s letter to Pir of Manki Sharif. The Pir had asked Jinnah if lives of Muslims shall be subject to Shariat? What Jinnah had promised was that affairs of the Muslim community would be subject to Shariat i.e. the Muslim personal law. No where did Jinnah promise to make Shariat the civil and criminal law of Pakistan. Shariat in British India referred to Personal Law. It is this law that is still in force in India.
Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 of India reads:
|2. Application of Personal Law of Muslims.- Notwithstanding any customs or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardiaship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than chartities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in case where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). |
This is the law in secular India today. Muslims of India are governed by Shariat in their affairs as a community. Does it affect Indian secularism in anyway? Communal Personal laws are an accepted part of English Jurisprudence. So it does not quite follow that Mr. Jinnah was referring to anything but this when he promised Pir of Manki Sharif that the affairs of Muslim community (not nation interestingly) shall be run by Shariat in Pakistan and that no Muslim would be forced to accept any unIslamic law, which implies – for those who use this double-edged sword to prove the impossible- that there was an element of choice that a Muslim may accept an unIslamic law out of his or her free will. This would obviously make it consistent with Jinnah’s life long support to mixed marriages bill.
And finally the issue of the alleged “laboratory of Islam” speech: without getting into the controversy of whether Jinnah actually did say it and assume that he did. Considering his Peshawar audience, this was almost revolutionary. After all was Islam not be “final” and “complete”? Was Jinnah talking of experimentation i.e. Ijtehad? Was he under Qadiani influence? It certainly does not mean that Jinnah wanted a conservative Islamic state.
The argument that Jinnah was secular does not mean necessarily a secularism of the French or Ataturk kind (even though Jinnah admired Ataturk greatly and described Ataturk’s Turkey as an exemplary Muslim state). Jinnah’s secularism was of the English variety schooled and crafted by British liberalism which was far more tolerant of religion.
Indeed he referred to English history in his land mark 11th August speech. If Pakistan is the citadel of Islam in South Asia, as some claim, England was the bastion of Protestantism in Europe. It is – technically- a protestant country today. Yet it is a perfect secular democracy because it does not have a state religion and every elected office in the country is open to every subject of the Queen regardless of religion, caste or creed. Now let us consider what Jinnah said:
“As you know, history shows that in England, conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”
It was the perfect summation of English secularism. It was also Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan. Jinnah’s Pakistan to sum it up was to be
- An inclusive democracy
- An impartial state without a state religion
- A state which ensured rule of law and equality of citizenship to all its citizens regardless of religion caste or creed.
- A state where a person’s religion was to be a personal matter.
No one- even those quoting Jinnah’s so called Islamic references- can deny these four postulates which Jinnah expressed repeatedly again and again. This is the essence of a secular state. This is why Jinnah was a liberal secular democrat in my view.
 p. 21, Ian Bryant Wells, Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity, Permanent Black New Delhi
 See Jinnah’s speech at the Delhi Session of the Muslim League of 1943 after Dr. A H Kazi tried to introduce a resolution committing Pakistan to Khilafat-e- Rashda. See Footnote on Page 96 of Ayesha Jalal’s “Sole Spokesman” published OUP.
 p.845, Zaidi, Z.H. (ed) (1993) Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan, Vol. I Part I. Lahore: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project
 p. 61, Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-1948, Oxford 1997
 p. 125 Ibid
 p.102-103 Ibid
 p. 153 Ibid
 p. 154 Ibid
 p. 223 Ibid
 p. 98 Ibid