The Undefined Equilibrium between Pakistan and Islam. Part 1: The Uneasy Equilibrium

by Adnan Syed

Note: This four part writeup on Islam and its vague relationship to Pakistan has its genesis in information exchange done in the comments section of the post “Pakistan’s Corrected Approach to deal with Taliban Thugs” during the month of September. I am thankful to YLH, Bonobashi, PMA, BC and many more for giving ideas about this writeup.

From 1947 onwards, most would agree that Pakistan lurched from one crisis to another.  A quick summary of Pakistanis history since its birth would probably read as follows.

Partition massacres left a deep scar on Pakistani psyche. Its towering founder who singlehandedly resurrected the Muslim League in a period of 10 years, and combined the diverse and often split Muslim electorate under the Muslim League umbrella, died too soon. India refused to hold referendum in Kashmir on extremely dubious grounds and a small scale war ensued where Pakistan got 1/3rd of the Kashmiri territory while India kept the rest. The first Prime Minister was shot dead within four years of independence, but not before he introduced the controversial “Objectives Resolution” that introduced the first state sanctioned religious theme into the affairs of the state and its future constitution.

1954 riots against religious minority segment, and failing civilian governments were followed by Army takeover of the country. 1956 constitution officially called Pakistan the Islamic Republic and declared that no law repugnant to Quran and Sunnah would be enacted, and existing laws be brought in accordance with Quran and Sunnah.  This constitution was abrogated two years later. However subsequent constitutions kept Pakistan as Islamic Republic, with Objectives Resolution remaining in the preamble of the constitutions.

In between, the majority province was getting alienated from its Western wing due to our heavy handed discrimination against them. A bloody war, where West Pakistan allegedly embarked on an ethnic pogrom styled massacres, resulted in Pakistan split into a less than half of its own initial size. A civilian-socialist politician took the reins of the country, and after a spotty six years in power was overthrown by an avowedly religious military dictator. Bhutto tried every game in town to stay in power, pushing country towards more religious mandated state level actions to appease the religious right. The military dictator who went by the term “Mard-e-Momin (The righteous Man)” aroused more religious sentiments to stay in power, resulting in radicalization of the new generation. His forays into Kashmir and Afghanistan, and his Islamization of the Pakistani society affect Pakistan to this day. However he was followed by two young, yet remarkably inefficient civilian leaders, who saw on their watch the conditions in Afghanistan go completely out of hand, all the time when their subordinate Army and Intelligence organizations propped one set of Mujahedeen after another, only to find a group of them that went out of control, turned Afghanistan into a seat of learning for all aspiring Muslim militants, who began to wreak havoc across the world.

The West duly followed the militants to their source, and the Mujahedeen now turned on Pakistan, beginning to target seemingly disparate areas in the name of imposing Sharia, and fighting the infidels. The new military man General Musharraf tried to subdue the religious rhetoric. Yet his uneven approach to dealing with the militancy, and his particularly horrific political and judicial manoeuvrings made him deeply unpopular. He was forced out of office and a democratic government is back in power, where (to much surprise to many), a political party chairman holds the office of Presidency. However the house leader aptly remains the Prime Minister.

With that quick summary of Pakistan’s last 62 years, there are a few themes that remained constant throughout Pakistani history:

1) Pakistan as a nation has suffered from a deep identity crisis. It vacillated between right wing Islamism, and more liberally oriented governance. Equally remarkable is that the so called left wing liberal leaders have never shied away from using Islam when the pressure from Islamists got too much, or when the left wing votes just did not cut it to stay in power

The identity confusion has not helped the governance and administration issues in Pakistan. The governance was quite weak to begin with; the civilian governments showed terrible administration skills, and their overthrows by the military backed regimes became admissible by the infamous judiciary’s doctrines of necessity.

2) In many ways, Pakistan has acted like a typical third world country; incomplete rule of law resulting in huge economic disparity and sordid growth rates. However, Pakistan’s instability was compounded by the frequent use of religion to unseat and destabilize exisiting governments, as well as religion’s frequent effects on Pakistan’s foreign and military policies. The absence of a solid idea about “what kind of state Pakistan ought to be” resulted in disparate variations of the Pakistan Ideology that were adapted by the rulers based on their own political leanings.

Comparing Pakistan to its bigger neighbour India shows a stark reality. India quickly determined that secularism inspired by 20th century humanism ideals would be the official policy. Even with communal biased right wing political parties in its system, the country remained secure in its generally secular Indian identity. India avoided the instability associated with state level confusion resulting from ambiguous religious role. India managed to practice imperfect, yet functioning democracy throughout its history and never seriously faced gut churning political upheavals that Pakistan did.

3) However, it is remarkable that Pakistan somehow keeps coming back to democratic system time after time. As a matter of fact, even the most despotic of dictators faced huge amount of pressure (and subsequently yielded) to allow the elections to take place and civilian rule to be restored. Unlike other third world Muslim countries like Egypt, Libya and Jordan, the one man rule under sham elections did not last much long in Pakistan.

4) We also notice that the theocratic rule has been unable to impose itself on Pakistani population, even though there is an active and vociferous right wing media present in the country since its inception. Remarkably, among the hoopla for the rule of Sharia, calls for return to Khilafat, and similar religious arguments, Pakistanis keep electing more centralist governments. Iranian styled theocratic state, or overtly religious governments styled after Saudi Arabia or Sudan have not yet taken root in Pakistan.

How the point 3 and 4 will play each other out is uncertain. There is a sizeable segment of population that embraces Islam as all encompassing code required not just at a personal level. However, majority population is a devoted follower, yet is uncomfortable both with modernity and its perceived evils, and with the rigid interpretation of Islam

This uneasy equilibrium between Islam and Pakistan has rocked Pakistan since its inception, and it is not going anywhere soon. Based on our look back at the Pakistani history, I maintain that the instability associated with the vagueness regarding Islam in the affairs of Pakistan will keep eating Pakistan inside out. Pakistan’s own uncertainty regarding its meanings has resulted in extremely risky behaviour on Pakistan’s part, where the consequences are coming back to haunt Pakistan badly.

Our northern areas as well as Southern Punjab belt is becoming a fertile grounds for breeding extremists and our policies of propping up proxy units to fight on our behalf in Kashmir and Afghanistan are now resulting in the same units turning back upon us.

We shall see that Islam has been linked with the idea of Pakistan from the very beginnings of Pakistan Movement, though the exact extent of that relationship remained quite unclear. The idea of an Islamic Pakistan caused substantial commotion in the Muslim League ranks, and Quaid gave exact statements to the effect that theocracy was not to be in Pakistan. We do however see the strategic vagueness regarding the role of Islam was indeed pursued by Quaid and the Muslim League and was never fully vanquished after the birth of Pakistan.

In the recesses of this vagueness, an idea of Nazaria-e-Pakistan took shape. Looking back at our pre-independence days, it is hard to see that Nazaria-e-Pakistan present in the way it is shown to us. The founding Muslim League members were hardly a religious lot; however studying their statements and their subsequent actions gives us some light on the evolution of Pakistan as a present Muslim majority quasi-Islamic country.

Tomorrow: Our Founding Fathers and their ideas about the religion and Pakistan



Filed under Identity, Islam, Jinnah's Pakistan, Pakistan

33 responses to “The Undefined Equilibrium between Pakistan and Islam. Part 1: The Uneasy Equilibrium

  1. Majumdar

    Adnan bhai,

    Good synopsis. But even without all these extraneous events (Cold War, Zia etc), Pakistan wud have been an Islamic state in some form or other (which is not to say that being an Islamic state is unnatural or even bad). Any state with a Muslim majority population (at least in Southern Asia which is a part of the world I am familiar with) is bound to be Islamic in some form or the other that cannot be avoided.


  2. Majumdar

    Btw, Islamic state did not necessarily mean Talibanistan.


  3. AZW

    @ Majumdar:

    Completely agree that a Muslim majority nation would have to have Islam being freely practiced in the society. A Muslim nation has Muslims living their lives as Muslims.

    However an Islamic nation is where the laws are specifically derived from the religious edicts. Here the believers and nonbelievers are differentiated by the state, so that the believers practice their faith at the cost of non-believers.

    Part 1 is introduction to the confusion that has reigned in Pakistan regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state. Part 2 and 3 will hopefully explain more of that confusion at the time of creation of Pakistan. And how Pakistan has lived for all of its life with the question of how much Islam is to be mixed with the state.



  4. yasserlatifhamdani


    I am not sure what “some form” means but a state that promises equal rights, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion in entirety, opportunity and other fundamental human rights (which is what Jinnah promised) for all its citizens is the irreducible minimum that we wish for Pakistan. If there is some form of an “Islamic state” that embodies all this, we will accept it.

    The problem is that we’ve seen by practical experience that this is not so.


    Excellent article.

  5. Majumdar

    Adnan bhai,

    #1Completely agree that a Muslim majority nation would have to have Islam being freely practiced in the society.

    #2However an Islamic nation is where the laws are specifically derived from the religious edicts. Here the believers and nonbelievers are differentiated

    When I said that any South Asian nation which has a Muslim majority population wud be an Islamic state, I meant #2, not #1. Given what Muslims (in general) think about what position Islam shud hold in an ideal state, it cannot be otherwise. And it need not necessarily be a bad thing at all.


  6. bonobashi


    Dada, I completely disagree with your proposition that a majority of Muslim citizens implies an Islamic state as a necessary and inevitable state constitution.

    For starters, if that had been so, Pakistan, for that matter, Bangladesh, which all of you keep ignoring all the time, would have been an ‘Islamic state’ a long time ago. This has not happened. That is because Pakistan, as an entity, taking the broad line of thinking of its citizens, has not been convinced of it.

    Consider how much concentrated effort and expenditure has gone into it.

    Please consider the vast fortunes from the Gulf Emirates and from Saudi Arabia that have been poured in. Please consider the increasing displacement of the state from the sphere of education in the Southern Punjab, to an extent which the Sangh Parivar must deeply envy. Please consider every public encouragement that the trend receives, from the pulpit after Friday prayers, from every spineless politician of the sort that Jinnah shouted down at a Muslim League meeting for articulating the infamous ‘Pakistan ka matlab kiya’ slogan, from those heads of government who aspired to be Leader/Commander of the Faithful, from the military itself, where beards became optional soon enough during Zia’s regime, I believe.

    In spite of these concerted and vigorous attempts, only elements of Pakistani society, elements concentrated just like our rebels and the disaffected from the state in the most underdeveloped areas, have ever subscribed to this ideology. It is the innate good sense, I would use a stronger word even than that were it not for fear of raking up a controversy and embittering the cud of the fundamentalist who might unexpectedly come across these lines, of the Pakistani people that has prevented this situation.

    That is not to say that it may not come to be. There is a critical mass in numbers to be achieved, and if, and when, this is achieved, there is reason to believe that the movement towards an ‘Islamic state’ will become inexorable in its progress.

    The evidence is clear; that has not happened, and it need not happen, although the doors to such an ending are gaping wide open.

    Before considering anything else, however, I would like to take issue with you for your convenient use of the label ‘Islamic state’. In the context of Pakistan, there are three, very widely different models that may be distinguished. I beg you to state clearly which one you refer to in your earlier passage, or if you did not have in mind a clear distinction at the time you wrote, perhaps it is not too late to ponder over it and offer your opinion on which it is that you consider most likely to prevail.

    First, there is the model that has been articulated so clearly by Jinnnah 62 years and more ago: a state populated by Muslims, obeying laws not repugnant to the tenets of Islam, encouraging the practices of Islam, but not governed by the religious, not a thecracy. This is the vision that has been so forcefully put forward by YLH, unless I have completely misunderstood him; and I would respond to it as a secularist and democrat by saying the mirror opposite of what D_a_n earlier did; provided that such a state does not restrict my right to practise such a religion, I would have no problem in belonging to it. D_a_n said this in the context of India; I say that any sane Indian, not the breast-beating lunatics who have camped on our columns, would find no difficulty with this proposition. It reflects, I believe, NOT the majority of Pakistan, as has been pointed out by our elder statesman, but a majority of those who think about these issues and worry about them.

    The second model seems to be the one that everybody is referring to as the only possible Islamic model, from Imran Khan up (my apologies to fanboys like our collegiate member from Dubai, no insult meant, not yet, not here). This is what Joe Stalin would have defined as Islam in a single state, on the lines of Communism in a single state, a manifestly impossible and contradictory formulation by the thinking and paradigms of the past. This implies that the people rule, subject to the laws of Islam, as interpreted by the jurists, and as modified by the jurists being free to enquire into the applicability of older interpretations into contemporary circumstances. There is no precise implementation of this model extant at this moment; there are close parallels, which are vitiated by the domination of extremist fringe elements which are unable to visualise a broad-based, multi-threaded, tolerant Islam, whose idea of Islam is that the worse it feels, the more Godly it must be.

    This is not the conception of an ‘Islamic state’ that was originally put forward, and that must be exhibited, if only to demonstrate its unworkability. The original ‘Islamic state’ was one, unitary, ruled by local authorities holding office under a supreme leader, appointed by the people through a process of informed consultation. This was perfectly feasible in a world which spanned the distance between two or three cities, where the numbers involved were intimate and decision-friendly, and where it was not an empire spanning an area larger than Alexander’s empire. It is manifestly not feasible now, and keeps cropping up and dislocating most discussions on the ‘Islamic state’. It seems best not to oppose it and wound the susceptibility of those who insist, on scant evidence, that the model was the best, for all time to come, time gone by as well as time to come until eternity.

    If we return to your insistence that an ‘Islamic state’ was/is inevitable, Dada, we presumably are talking of the second type, a progressive or a retrograde theocracy. If, in 62 years, the people of Pakistan have not been convinced, what is the period within which you believe that the inevitable must happen? If a future regime starts dismantling the funding machinery of the fundamentalists, and the education machinery that breeds foot soldiers for their struggle, can you possibly guarantee that the situation will not reverse itself?

    Can you, in short, rule out conclusively a political settlement a little more to the Godward than the first model, possibly a council of religious elders with the right to veto antipathetic legislation, and less to the Godward than the second, possibly with built-in, hardwired clauses and defence mechanisms guarding the population against the hardening of punishment for various crimes, and specifically segregating those not observant from the applicability of religious prescriptions?

  7. bonobashi

    A correction, or rather, a clarification:

    provided that such a state does not restrict my right to practise such a religion, I would have no problem in belonging to it. D_a_n said this in the context of India

    Here what is being referred to is the religion to which I was born, not the religion recognised by the state as representative of the majority.

  8. Majumdar

    Bono da,

    You must read me carefully my disclaimer “Islamic state of sorts”. Which is to say that South Asian Muslim majority states (in the first half of 21st century at least) will have Islam as a motif of the state in some form or other. A good eg is our native B’desh (which for some reason I keep ignoring all the time)- it was created as a result of a purely secular struggle but within a few years of its creation it adopted Islam as its official religion.


  9. bonobashi


    Apologies. I bungled.

  10. yasserlatifhamdani

    I suppose this is where we must introduce Malaysia into the discussion…

    Is it an Islamic state? or a Secular state? Frankly the only state more confused than Pakistan in the world is Malaysia but for Malaysia the confusion works famously.

  11. Majumdar

    Yasser Pai,

    but for Malaysia the confusion works famously.

    Yes, that is why I said Islamic states are not necessarily bad.

    A very good example is closer at hand- Maldives. It has Islam as its state religion but at the same time it is by far the wealthiest and most developed state of the countries in the SAARC region. And the one with the least instances of discrimination and violence towards religious minorities.

    Frankly the only state more confused than Pakistan in the world

    The confusion is only in your and Civvie mian’s minds- Pakistanis by and large are very sure about what they want Pakistan to be.


  12. yasserlatifhamdani

    “This is the vision that has been so forcefully put forward by YLH, unless I have completely misunderstood him”

    My personal preference ofcourse would be to keep religion out of the equation altogether… but I do understand that religion would play some defining role in law-making in any state populated by Muslims… this has more to do with Islam’s current stage of evolution that anything else… I don’t have a particular problem with this… the common law system that we inherited from the British allows for it and historically Christianity’s ecclesiastical law was accorded a similar status in English tradition. (Ironically Jinnah the barrister told the final meeting of the All India Muslim League in December 1947 that “In Islam there is no concept of an ecclesiastical state”)

    What is unacceptable is the bulldozing of state and secular institutions by exclusivist interpretations of religious law.

  13. yasserlatifhamdani

    Majumdar mian,

    I can assure you that you are quite wrong about what you think Pakistanis want their state to be.

    The only thing that is quite clear is that they don’t want to live under Mullah-Raj. It is clear as day.
    Also… I think you do us less than justice when you say BC and I are confused… we are not. We too are quite clear about the kind of state we want.

    Now that we’ve established that a state ought to be what people want it to be … could you tell me where and when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised the Islamic constitution in his electoral manifesto that he ultimately forced down Pakistanis’ throats? Don’t mirror the Mullah and say “islam is our religion” was the first tenet of the PPP…be that as it may, PPP manifesto of 1967 was completely secular.

    If the people of Pakistan wanted an Islamic state they had much better more sincere advocates of the Islamic State than

    1. M A Jinnah

    2. Liaqat Ali Khan

    3. Fatima Jinnah

    4. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

    5. Mujeeb ur Rahman

    6. Benazir Bhutto

    7. Nawaz Sharif/Shahbaz Sharif

    8. Asif Ali Zardari

  14. Majumdar

    Yasser Pai,

    The only thing that is quite clear is that they don’t want to live under Mullah-Raj.

    When did I say that?


  15. yasserlatifhamdani

    Also the current party positions also show that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis have elected secular politicians…

    The PPP today, MQM, ANP are no votaries of an Islamic state per se (though the last one has played with fire true to its character in Swat). The two Muslim Leagues may be right leaning but even they haven’t shown or roused people on this slogan… both PML-N and PML-Q has its fair share of nay-sayers and politicians who don’t share the nazriati angle that their parties might at times bring up.

    The point is that if the electorate is to determine what Pakistan should be… Pakistanis have again shown their preference for a secular state by rejecting the Islamists…

  16. bonobashi


    Regarding Malaysia, that was one of the two models which suggest themselves:

    …there are close parallels, which are vitiated by the domination of extremist fringe elements…

    Might it be that the federal constitution of Malaysia acts as a natural balance to the extremist factions ruling some of the northern states? If one state goes too far, the others serve as brakes; and the federal government always has residual powers, I presume. This may be why, although they huff and they puff, the Islamists haven’t really done anything extreme.

  17. yasserlatifhamdani

    Karun mian,

    Thank you for your comments (which I have deleted).

    Indeed what a lot… but then we were never ruled by Emperors/Empress Nehru-Gandhi I, II, III, IV …

    And what to say of the rest of the motley crew that ruled your country… I suppose the inventor of the Desai Cola was a real genius.

    Like I remarked a few days ago… the difference between Pakistanis and Indians is that Pakistanis know their shit stinks… Indians think their shit is sooji ka halwa. May you be blessed with a healthy portion of Panch Gaviya now…

  18. Majumdar

    Yasser Pai,

    Re: Panchgavya

    You may laugh at this but a fellow chowkie (an anarchist, non religious Madrasi Hindoo by the way) whose family are farmers swears by panchgavya. He says that for over a decade they have used nothing but panchgavya (and such other stuff) as fertiliser and pesticides in their farm and their yield far beats those of conventional farmers.

    For other less important matters (ie Pakistan’s Constt etc) I will come back later.


  19. bonobashi


    Using organic fertilisers and avoiding chemical fertiliser and pesticide alike has given birth to a multi-million dollar organic food industry worldwide. Perhaps if time permits, we can take a look at how the Japanese too have taken this approach in very successful adaptations of organic farming – with no intervention from holy cows.

    To assign some magical, mystical attributes to the output of the cow is just plain irrational. Just to remind you, although limited only to the excreta, the very practical Chinese do just as well with human and porcine excretions.

  20. yasserlatifhamdani

    “very practical Chinese do just as well with human and porcine excretions”

    The contents of Desai Cola, if I am not mistaken, were entirely human too…

  21. Majumdar

    Bono da,

    I have read One Straw Revolution by Fukuoka- san, there he uses mainly on straw and chicken s**t.

    Btw, once I had been suffering from chronic digestive ailments and it was suggested that I use gao mutra. I politely turned down the offer.


  22. Bloody Civilian

    it [BDesh] was created as a result of a purely secular struggle but within a few years of its creation it adopted Islam as its official religion.

    it was created as a result of a purely secular and democratic struggle (that turned into a bit of a personality cult, afterwards) but within a few years of its creation it turned into a military dictatorship and adopted Islam as its official religion.

    malaysia also was not a democracy. although the fact that mahathir was a capable leader, is another matter. any cause-effect analysis must differentiate between the the compulsions and expediencies of dictarship (civilian and military differentiated) and the popular versions of both in a democracy. that no post-colonial muslim majority country has escaped dictatorship, may be a question at least partially answered by such an effort.

    turkey and some other examples are there of dictaroships or the dictatorial military checking against any pandering to religion, by the state, as the lowest common denominator.

  23. Bloody Civilian

    majumdar da

    I politely turned down the offer

    i hope the politeness was correctly addressed to the party most likely to misunderstand your refusal an an affront.


  24. bonobashi


    What cola? Never heard of it! And you can go on for the next 100 years, and I shan’t have heard of it!!


    There you go again, showing me up for the simpleton I am! Fukuoka it was, and his last straw 😉

    @Bloody Civilian

    To be perfectly honest, I hadn’t claimed any democratic element in those two states, though I am aware that Ghamidi has clearly proven that democracies are perfectly compatible with the precepts of the Quran.

    The point is, in principle, Islam and democracy are not incompatible.

  25. Bloody Civilian

    without democracy and free and fair elections… how can we tell whether the majority of the people want it or not.. or agree with it or not?

    islam and democracy are not incompatible to the extent that it might be difficult to come up something religious that clearly and entirely censures democracy. but then sufi muhammad and his ilk clearly consider democracy to be unislamic and even the ‘ulema’ who participate in it to be infidels.

    the proof of ghamidi’s recipe will of course only be in the eating. my point was that the motives of a dictatrship cannot be overlooked by any analyses. just like sufi muhammad’s motives in conveniently forgetting that he himself is an apostate for once being a candidate in a local govt elections… as fellow-apostate munawar hassan of JI reminded him.

    the mixing of religion and state in many muslim countries is at least as much a mixing of religion and dictatorial politics as it is one of religion and democratic politics. the contribution is not always equal between democrats or dictators? also, who is first to let the genie out of the bottle? who responsible for failing to put it back in?

  26. Hayyer

    I think the debate is getting ahead of the author. These points are bound to come up as further parts come on line and the argument will need refining later on. Fundamentally, it is Bonobashi’s categories and then YLH’s response.
    I gather YLH does not want religion in any form in governance but accepts that some effect in the laws is inescapable. Between Majumdar’s Islamic state and Bonobashi’s categories 2) and 3) there can be many a billion shades of difference.
    A secular state as Jinnah envisioned and which we have an imperfect in India is one thing. The OR opens the doors to anything. Let us see how the argument develops in the main article.
    If I may point out a small error of fact;
    “India refused to hold referendum in Kashmir on extremely dubious grounds and a small scale war ensued where Pakistan got 1/3rd of the Kashmiri territory while India kept the rest.”
    The war came first, the denial of referendum subsequently.

  27. bonobashi


    I guess you are right. We need to give AZW time to develop his arguments. It’s just that it was so apt a piece, and so well harmonised. Mum’s the word here on, although it will mean a superhuman effort withstanding temptation.

  28. Bloody Civilian

    the denial of referendum subsequently.

    delaying tactics for some years, denial by other methods for another few… but when did the proper denial take place?

  29. PMA

    bonobashi (October 16, 2009 at 11:49 am):

    Sir, you have taken great care to outline the three models of an Islamic State. The first model was a visionary one. It had never been tried anywhere else accept in Turkey to some extent. Had Pakistan clamped down its clergy from the day one like Ataturk did, perhaps this model would have worked for sometime in Pakistan as well. But we all know that the young state of Pakistan did not or could not do it. The result is the vagueness and the confusion that exists regarding the acceptable role of Islam in our country Pakistan; something the author Adnan Syed has pointed out in this part of his article. I am afraid that a lot of water has gone under the bridge in the last six decades. At this stage of our national life we need to assess our current problems and find solutions in the light of today’s realities, not by looking through the back mirror of ‘could have, should have’.

    As for as the third model goes; it exists only in our nostalgic minds. We have not seen that model anywhere for the last millenium. But Pakistan is a Muslim country (not a Muslim majority country). It would be virtually impossible to take religion Islam out of the society. Then, perhaps a middle ground where well defined ‘laws of god’ and ‘laws of man’ could exist side by side will be a workable model for Pakistan. Turkey is heading in that direction. May be Pakistan can do the same. Adnan is taking a stab at the issue of state and religion. Let us hear him out without going on a tangent propelled by our predetermined biases and set ideological positions. This promises to be a great discussion.

  30. Hayyer

    It would take much research to find a first statement that no referendum will occur. Sh. Abdullah’s arrest marks the watershed. Nehru first spoke of making the Ceasefire Line a border in a speech in Parliament in 1955. It must have been around then.

  31. bonobashi


    I apologise for being precipitate. It was just too exciting to refrain from comment, but I shall hold my tongue. Hayyer has already pointed out the need.

    May I mention that the second model was defined with some of your posts, including those which indicated a resignation to dealing with a post-model 1 situation in the real world? While I would wish ardently for the first to be possible, perhaps through a miracle, you have already pointed out that realism demands that today’s practical situation be borne in mind.

    I am waiting the further exposition with avid expectation. This is good stuff!

  32. AZW

    @ Hayyer:

    You are correct. Outright refusal for referendum did not happen explicitly until 1950s. A better choice of words would be Kashmir Accession was beginning to brew into a huge mess and a small scale war ensued.

    Writing this whole series was not easy. I have a whole lot respect for prolific writers who write op-eds regularly here at PTH and every where in the print media.


  33. Hayyer

    I am looking forward avidly to further installments.