By Mansur Ejaz of Daily Times
Besides eliminating the Taliban and other jihadis, the basic irrationalities of the system have to be addressed. Otherwise Pakistan will continue to languish in poverty and chaos
Following the legalisation of medical marijuana in California, the ‘pot’ business is booming, and is bringing in large tax revenues for the state. California is generally the leader among the United States in innovation and progressive trends, from healthcare to environmental policy. Usually, the rest of the United States eventually ends up following California.
Assuming the state to be a rational entity is baseless. States may lie higher or lower on a scale of rationality. California is higher on this scale because it takes scientific and social research very seriously and acts upon it. The Southern United States are quite low on the rationality scale because they stick to 19th century laws, and disregard science and prescriptions based on objective research.
Does California — and other countries that behave rationally — provide a model to be followed or should it be dismissed in the name of ‘indigenous peculiarities and purity of culture’? Where does the Pakistani state lie on the rationality scale?
Pakistan is one of those states that have been sliding down the rationality scale through efforts to fulfil the demands of theocracy. In the early 1950s, Pakistani cities were similar to other urban centres in the world, and had a diverse culture, including bars, horse racing and the rest.
Then came Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s opportunistic concessions — banning the sale of liquor, horse racing, and making Friday the weekly holiday. Most of the remaining work was completed by Zia-ul Haq, prompting then Amir Jama’at-e Islami Mian Tufail Muhammad to state that an Islamic system had been put in place and that it was now up to the people to act upon it. The people, though, never listened to Mian sahib’s advice and continued with their social practices in the open and in the shadows.
If one examines each step taken towards this end to be theoretically correct, one finds unsettling results. Before this wave, Pakistan was becoming the hub of Middle Eastern investors for various reasons: Beirut was in trouble and the Gulf states had not developed a liberal environment, investment opportunities and an entertainment infrastructure.
However, the turn towards theocracy reversed this trend completely: instead of Middle Easterners coming to Pakistan, prosperous Pakistanis started setting up second homes and shifting capital to the Gulf and other international centres. Thus began the biggest drain of capital and talent from Pakistan.
The replacement of Sunday with Friday as the weekly holiday also caused immeasurable damage to Pakistani businesses, which were now out of sync with the global economy. Thanks to Nawaz Sharif, who as a businessman realised the damage being caused by this policy, the decision was reversed. However, all other decisions taken for the sake of constructing a theocracy have remained, despite their disastrous consequences.
To purify the cities, “shahi mohallas” were banned, driving sex workers into other localities of the cities. This did not curb prostitution, rather it flourished. The flourishing sex industry also provided money-making opportunities for law enforcement officials and other related entities. In short, not only was society polluted, institutions of the state became much more vulnerable to corruption. This was similar to forcing a cancerous tumour to spread into the rest of the body.
The results of the liquor sale ban were the same. With the ban on alcohol, heroin and other hard drugs victimised millions of Pakistanis. This drug culture also helped give birth to and finance extremist groups and promoted violence in Pakistan. Further, home-brewing increased alcohol consumption to greater level. Corrupt officials and bootleggers prospered. Thus this decision, intended to further the establishment of a theocratic state, worsened the problem it was supposed to solve.
The expat experience regarding alcohol consumption is very relevant to this point. Every brand and type of alcohol is available in the United States to adults above the age of 21. However, hardly one in every thousand Pakistani expats will consume alcohol, even on a casual basis. Alcohol consumption among female expats, even in the high-income group, is almost zero. Therefore it is clear that the availability of some undesirable goods does not mean the common person will run to it.
It is clear that the Pakistani state has gone from bad to worse as far as rationality is concerned. The state never bothered to initiate objective academic studies of policy outcomes, which would have helped shape better policies. Lawmakers have been so negligent and hypocritical that members casting votes in favour of religious laws during the day have been consuming alcohol in the evenings!
Such hypocrisies have accentuated irrationalities in the system. The emergence of the Taliban and other extremist groups was also an outcome of the promotion of an irrational socio-political environment. Therefore, besides eliminating the Taliban and other jihadis, the basic irrationalities of the system have to be addressed. Otherwise Pakistan will continue to languish in poverty and chaos.
42 Comments
July 2, 2009 at 1:55 am
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July 4, 2009 at 12:59 pm
all along indo muslim politics has been governed by narrow class interests:–
1-in order to avoid competition and to have a position of unfair advantage the muslims of minority provinces raised the slogan of muslim separatism.soon they were able to manipulate the muslims of majority provinces.
2-pashtuns used by the so called secular state in kashmir as cannon fodder in 1947-48 in kashmir.
3-afghanistan destroyed literally by an illegitimate military dictator to get US and saudi aid and to survive in power.
4-afghanistans destruction continued by civilian and military elites in name of strategic depth from 1988 till 2001.
5- u turn made again to get US dollars in 2001 because of greed and arm twisting by USA.military action launched in tribal areas in 2003 when there was no provocation.
6-Pashtuns and afghans used as cannon fodder in kashmir as a policy from 1989 till 2000.
7-now a counter insurgency launched again for US dollars.
again there is a line of thought that infiltration in kashmir should be re-started so that the pashtuns are occupied in kashmir.
there is no policy only adhocism and naked opportunism
July 4, 2009 at 1:29 pm
Once again I must post my dissenting view…
1. is inverted. It was the Muslim majority in Muslim majority areas particularly Punjab… as well as Bengal and Sindh .. who wanted the central authority diluted… and raised the issue of separatism … and then convinced the Muslim minority provinces of it. Allama Iqbal, Ch. Rahmat Ali, Mian Kifayet Ali, Sir Muhammad Shafi and Sir Fazli Hussain – that champion of separate electorates and scourge of the Congress Party- were all Punjabis. The Muslims of the minority provinces through their organ the Muslim League did not adopt this slogan till 1940… the question for them was never of unfair advantage but adequate safeguards. Their strategy seems to have been to bring together under one banner the cross purposes of Muslim majority provinces and the Muslims in Hindu provinces.
2. The architect of the Kashmir invasion was General Akbar Khan. You are the military expert… but my information suggests that General Akbar Khan was a Pushtun and possibly related to the Ghaffar Khan clan.
3, 4 and 6 are correct. 5 and 7 are justified. The formula of strategic depth was a ridiculous idea. Given the Pakistani nation states problems with Pushtun Nationalism, we should have encouraged an Afghan Nationalism instead of exclusively Pushtun elements.
July 4, 2009 at 8:02 pm
it is well known that muslim separatism originated from UP . Francis Robinson and many other scholars agree with this assertion.
the muslim majority provinces were comfortable with hindus and sikhs as the unionist party in punjab proves and the muslim league was routed in the 1936 elections in punjab.
the NWFP too was congress controlled till 1947 through khudai khidmatgars.
shafi,fazl i hussain all belonged to the unionist party which was a toady party with close ties with the british.
iqbal contrary to myths wanted a muslim majority province in indias northwest rather than a state.
July 4, 2009 at 8:13 pm
as far as kashmir is concerned.it was a muslim league high command decision and akbar was merely told to organise the pashtun lashkars alongwith cunningham the governor .shaukat hayat and major khurshid were the muslim league functionaries assigned to organise the invasion.
the most cowardly part of pakistani role in kashmir was first taking the tribesmen to kashmir and then shamelessly abandoning them when the indian army attacked them from november 1947 to april 1948.
July 4, 2009 at 8:18 pm
the political class in pakistan cannot be exonerated of using the extremists.it is no secret that the taliban were patronised by the PPP in benazirs second tenure and her interior minister NUK Babar called them his boys.the same support was continued under nawaz regime.
in second nawaz regime the pakistani forces became actually physically involved along with the so called mujahideen in kashmir.
July 4, 2009 at 8:52 pm
A H Amin sb,
I don’t know how you define “separatism”…but I think you are inverting the whole history on its head.
The reason why Muslim League was trounced in 1937 elections in Punjab was because it was seen as a party of Muslims of UP, Bombay etc which was close to the Congress (the pro-congress Hindu industrialists contributed to the Muslim League kitty because they thought that it would be pro-Congress) and did not speak for the interests of the Muslim majority provinces. So Muslim League’s defeat in elections of 1937 and overwhelming victory in the 1946 elections actually shows a clear indication that it was only after League adopted the separatism of the Muslim majority provinces that it won elections in the Muslim majority provinces.
Meanwhile a Punjabi author Mian Kifayet Ali, funded by Nawab of Mamdot, wrote “Pakistan” plan inspired by Iqbal’s Allahabad Address and Ch. Rahmat Ali’s PAKSTAN pamphlet… before this went to print, Jinnah saw the manuscript in 1939 and suggested that the name be changed from Pakistan Plan to “Confederacy of India”. K K Aziz wrote a remarkable paper on this scheme which you should read.
Suffice to say Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution mainly to satisfy Muslims of Muslim Majority Provinces and therefore Muslim separatism – however that may be defined- emerged from Muslim majority provinces and not Hindu Majority provinces.
We need to go a bit further back in history to the Round table conference to understand the role of Punjabi Muslims and Bengali Muslims and their antagonism to a strong center which caused as many problems for Jinnah’s faction of the Muslim League as it did for Congress… and we should even go further to the Lucknow Pact where the Muslims of the Muslim majority provinces felt that the Muslim League had sacrificed their interests and majorities in the name of Hindu-Muslim Unity.
So it is not “well known” at all. Either Francis Robinson is plain wrong or you’ve misinterpreted him. You should read Ayesha Jalal’s “Sole Spokesman”.
As for Kashmir… according to Alastair Lamb, Jinnah was kept completely in the dark about the Kashmir operation. I haven’t read anything about Liaqat Ali Khan being involved in it.
“the most cowardly part of pakistani role in kashmir was first taking the tribesmen to kashmir and then shamelessly abandoning them when the indian army attacked them from november 1947 to april 1948″
We won’t talk of what the tribesmen did for R and R delaying their invasion of Srinagar Airport and giving the Indian Army room to land… but I am surprised that you’ve failed to mention General Gracey’s refusal to move troops.
“iqbal … wanted a province instead of a state”
And the Muslim League also wanted an Indian Union based on a confederation of this “Province” with the rest of India. Iqbal used the word “state” and Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan… most Muslims in Hindu Majority Provinces wanted this too. So what is it that you mean by separatism.
July 4, 2009 at 11:05 pm
This is beginning to get warm-without easterly winds. At an appropriate stage the Indian Brigade will pitch in, and then where will we be?
July 4, 2009 at 11:43 pm
At an appropriate stage the Indian Brigade will pitch in, and then where will we be?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Discussing human rights.
Just kidding. I could not resist the opening you provided.
Regards.
July 5, 2009 at 11:24 am
@ylh
There’s an uncharacteristic gap in the logic here.
Jinnah was kept completely in the dark, according to Alastair Lamb; there is no evidence of Liaqat Ali Khan’s involvement. Then who gave Akbar Khan, I believe still a serving officer at that time, his orders? That too in the teeth of Gracey’s refusal to move regulars. Surely you’re not saying that a senior officer decided that his British C-in-C was talking through the back of his neck and took independent action, without his Prime Minister’s consent, and without his Governor-General’s knowledge?
I’m sorry but that’s doing it too brown (pun unintended).
July 5, 2009 at 12:47 pm
Well Alastair Lamb’s account of Jinnah being in the dark is seconded by many people.
About Liaqat Ali Khan – I haven’t seen any evidence of his involvement either.
I think you ought to read a bit about General Akbar Khan DOC …not to be confused with the other General Akbar Khan. His role a few years later in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case is also well documented.
July 5, 2009 at 12:50 pm
Let me make a controversial statement. The reason INdia has never had a coup is because you have only 2 percent Muslims. In the army.
July 5, 2009 at 1:58 pm
Now that is what I call an opening. Are you referring to a presumed incompatibility of Islam and democracy, or do you imply that Hindu generals are timid? If the latter are you in favour of coups; if only as a demonstration of Islamic virility?
July 5, 2009 at 3:28 pm
No neither. I should have said… Muslims and Sikhs really. Bloody indisciplined people(s) both.
There is no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. There is only an issue of evolution of Muslims and Sikhs…
July 5, 2009 at 4:45 pm
Surely you’re not saying that a senior officer decided that his British C-in-C was talking through the back of his neck and took independent action, without his Prime Minister’s consent, and without his Governor-General’s knowledge?
akbar khan’s subsequent shenanigans seem to confirm the suggestion.
July 5, 2009 at 5:13 pm
Bloody indisciplined people(s) both.
so they can only be disciplined by the/a military regimen/regime. the british had no choice but to recruit them rather than those indians whose loyalty was suspect (incl non-’martial race’ muslims). the two successor states have continued with the same policy. it would have been interesting had jinnah’s suggestion for a non-communal partition of the british indian army not been rejected out of hand by the INC. the indian army would still be 20% or more muslim. pak army would still be overwhelmingly punjabi but non-communal.
do you imply that Hindu generals are timid?
what proportion of indian army is marattha? why doesn’t the IA recruit gujratis?
July 5, 2009 at 5:57 pm
Not Muslims and Sikhs YLH, but Punjabis or Pathans.
BC: Gujratis don’t like joining the army, much as Sindhis don’t. Maharatha is not the same as Maharashtrian. No statistics are put out.
July 5, 2009 at 6:24 pm
On purely military grounds, I must defend the recruitment policy of the Indian army (don’t know about the navy or the airforce). After the 1962 debacle with China, it became clear that all the “martial race” and “capable classes” talk was pure b.s. And that India needed to decolonize its army in order to make it both more effective and more representative (in fact the decolonization of the Indian army is singularly unstudied but is very comprehensive). So, now each state gets a quota for recruitment as a percentage of population. Hence, the largest share actually goes to U.P. and Bihar and the share of Punjab has gone down significantly. If the recruitment quotas are not filled (e.g. in Gujarat and Orissa), they are redistributed. The officer class too is far more diverse in origin than it was in the old “haw-haw, koi-hai” days. Buried in the second or third pages of the newspapers you will find mention of how cadet so-and-so, son of a Kanpur paanwalla, won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. It’s the army that makes officers out of men, rather than class origins (of course you have the usual complaints from the usual suspects about “the quality going down”, but it’s these same “low quality” lot who retook Tiger Hill and are still patrolling the borders effectively). Finally, besides the obviously more stable civilian authority, I think it is the sheer diversity of India’s armed forces (spread across so many communities and states) that ensures that there is no military coup. I mean, how would a small group even start to create multiple loyalties across so many lines to build up internal support for a coup?
July 5, 2009 at 7:05 pm
@YLH
You had plunged me
1. Into feverish sociological and ethnic analysis;
2. Into deep, exhausted slumber, from which I have just woken up, and find that you have reduced the matter from a conundrum to a conjecture.
With Sikhs in the picture, it’s easy.
The Indian Army has generally followed the principle of seniormost general getting the job of COAS. In my analytical throes, I prepared a table showing what had happened each time Pakistan got a military dictator, and mapping those four incidents (not counting Iskandar Mirza) onto hypothetical Indian situations.There were no promotions of badly reported generals, like Ayub and Zia (the A to Z of Pakistani political interference in military matters, the Alpha and the Omega if you like), no multiple extensions as happened immediately before 58 in a number of cases, and as far as we know, only one touch-and-go case: Harbaksh vs. Manekshaw. Finally, as she admitted somewhere, it was Indira’s personal inclination that got Manekshaw the job; otherwise there was very, very little to choose between them.
Another complication is the structure. As PAVOCavalry will remind us, the IA has two levels of Lieutenants General, the Corps Commander and the GOC-in-C. By the time they reach this level, the intensity of the competition generally means that you can select any of the Corps Commanders arbitrarily with a pin, and get identical results – at the decision end. Then you have radically different personalities putting their stamp on the Army to the amazement of all outsiders but to either the delight or the resigned shrugs of insiders. Some tend to be polarisers, hugely. Others tend to be either unfortunate, or get exposed by events.
I am contrasting this to the Pakistani model.
That was a positive influence on the quality of leadership. A not so positive influence is that, following as we do the British system of command, the general officer, division onwards, gives his orders and then settles back to watch what the brigadiers and the colonels do to lead the rest into battle. This was not so among, say, the Germans. Statistics about the percentage of German general staff dying in battle, because they were always to be found in the front ranks (there were exceptions; there are always exceptions, and not dishonourable ones, just ones who believed that they had different responsibilities in command), will amaze those who look it up. The old German Army depended heavily on its staff at every level, and that staff, nurtured in the completely independent-minded Prussian tradition, took the principles of battle from the commander, and then converted it into orders in great detail, and then continued to support front-echelons with responses to emerging realities in battle.
There was very little of the sub-continental ‘Hamare liye kya hukam hai?’ stuff going on there.
The result is that in the Indian Army, there does tend to be a split between the Major General and the Brigadier, and from the Major General level onwards, a certain – how shall I put it? – confidence in being right, in being in tune with the universe by divine ordination, creeps in, to the detriment of certain qualities. Again, there are exceptions, there are always exceptions.
Why is this important for YLH’s explosive remark? Because someone has to lead a coup. In Pakistan, it has been the generals, always. After a small amount of thinking about the subject (it deserves surely weeks, months of thought and analysis), my very ginger conclusion is that in India, a coup led by the generals would not have happened; a coup by the colonels might, just barely might have.
They would have needed a casus belli. The earliest was Indira Gandhi’s assassination; next we had turmoil as Morarji came in, pissed everyone off and went out, a possible occasion, when we had Charan Singh follow him; then V. P. Singh and Chandrasekhar; finally Vajpayee the first embarrassing time, Gujral and Deve Gowda (or was it the other way around? Who cares?). I think the Army was stunned into disbelief as much as the rest of us were, and its radicals and badmaashes couldn’t get their wits about them quickly enough to react: thank Heavens for that as a democrat, and woe is me as a patriot – would they be equally stunned if China – when China – puts five divisions through Nathu La and cuts the links between North East India and the rest of India? A bad feeling, mixed with the relieved one.
I forgot India during the Nav Nirman movement. It did seem a bit scary for some days.
Bottom line:
1. By the time a general comes to the top, he has had all his angularities polished away. YLH may be right in singling out Muslims and Sikhs for being rowdy, although in my personal opinion, there is nothing more fearful than a Jat determined to do what he thinks wrong-headedly is right; but Muslims and Sikhs have been gradually filtered out by the system. You will notice that in spite of the reasonable number of Muslims at division level (there were exceptions; there always are), and the large number of very competent Sikh generals up to the level of Corps Commanders, only J. J. Singh came through the exhausting running of the gauntlet.
2. The colonels in India are far too junior to get together and form a cabal, as in Greece, in Spain in the 30s of the last century, in Egypt, and in Syria, in Iraq (both in support of the secular Ba’ath, it might be noted). Does one count Libya or avert one’s eyes and hurry past?
3. The Army is busy fighting somewhere or the other all the bloody time, when is there time to sit and plot?
4. The generals have always been far away from politics, consciously and proudly, which is a blessing, thus ruling out an Indonesia, a Burma, a Thailand….Are there any other nations in the vicinity with Generals leading coups? No names come to mind readily
These are hasty thoughts, and YLH, you are to be cursed for throwing this really stunning thought onto the floor and totally wrecking what was turning out to be a peaceful Sunday. There will be retribution, fell vengeance – just let me think of something suitably malevolent.
Sometimes I can’t help feeling bitterly that you did this for fun, to watch the comic shambles that ensues.
July 5, 2009 at 7:27 pm
Exhaustive analysis if not exhausted cereberally. Sleep must have helped.
Not true that India promotes only good generals. The late unlamented Lt. Gen. Kaul of Himalyan infamy comes to mind. He got promoted and given a Corps to command because of Nehru’s weakness for his own sort. And let us not forget his daughter Indira who ensured that Lt. General PS Bhagat the Army Commander in Udhampur superannuated by giving General Bewoor an extension of a few months. This enables Lt. General Raina to become Chief. Bhagat as some may recall won the Victoria Cross, and he wasn’t even a practicing Sikh. So, gallantry did not matter either.
The Airforce was thought to be a safe command for Sikhs till Air Marshall MM Singh was done in by Rajiv Gandhi because of an affair with his secretary whom he later married. While on the subject let us not forget Lt. Gen. Nanda the Army Commander at Udhampur again who was cheated out of his right by Rajiv Gandhi because he did not like his presentation. Nanda wasn’t even a Punjabi being a Coorgi.
Harbaksh Singh was junior to Maneckshaw thought the better general it is said. Bangladesh was mostly Jacob’s doing.
Coups in India? You must have smoked something. There is often wistful talk at the junior level inspired no doubt by our neighbour, of taking over. But such talk is never heard after they are in line for regimental command. Coups may be alright in Pakistan where the army is Punjabi and Pakistani is mainly Punjabi. In India it would survive the traffic crossing India Gate.
July 5, 2009 at 7:35 pm
General Raina who was also a Kashmiri Pandit was of no help to Indira in 1977 when official circles in Delhi were agog with rumours that Indira would rather fight than quit.
On the subject of Air Marshals can you enlighten me Bonobashi about the true age of Arjan Singh. Why does he keep misreporting it 10 years below the norm. I thought that was reserved for the other sex, not for Marshals, especially not for a non prima donna like Arjan Singh. He retired as Chief in 1967 after four years at the top. That means he was 58 then, and is nearly a hundred now. I read many years ago his admission that he took part in the air campaign against the Pathans in 1933 ( was it the one led by the Faqir of Ipi, over the Hindu/Sikh girl allegedly forcibly converted and married). They were flying something called Wapiti I think.
July 5, 2009 at 7:39 pm
7:57: comment. Last line please read ‘It would not survive the traffic crossing India gate.’ The coup that is.
July 5, 2009 at 7:59 pm
@Sharmishtha
Excellent input. Thank you for pointing out the conscious diversification, across so-called martial races and others, and the democratization of the officer corps, although thankfully there is still a significant proportion of Army brat going into service, and the general complexity of composition of the Army.
For the Air Force (slightly larger) and the Navy (the smallest of the three), it has always been technology driven, and there was never any consideration of martial races.
This is the time to confess with some mild embarrassment that there were two Bengali COASs. People look at Subrata Mukherjee and A. K. Chatterjee and forget Chaudhuri and Roychowdhury.
July 5, 2009 at 8:11 pm
Both Chaudhuri and Roy Chowdhuri came in indirectly. Chaudhry because Thapar was in disgrace and resigned after India’s China war, and Roy Chowdhuri because of a judicial decision. The latter had been shunted to head Training Command in Simla.
July 5, 2009 at 8:16 pm
Apropos of Sharmishta’s comment. The army has rightly discarded the martial races theory. The proliferation of officers with surnames Jain, Gupta, Aggarwal is a good indication of this, but these classes dont join as recruits. Non fighting is considered a virtue in Gujrat, one wishes non violence were. The name Ranchhod being so popular as a preferred variation of Krishna’s.
July 5, 2009 at 8:23 pm
@hayyer48
Sleep didn’t help. I got up worried and upset until I realised that we were being had by YLH, may the Mullahs get him and tickle him to death with a feather duster applied to the soles of the feet.
Troublemaker.
I had forgotten the Bewoor- Prem Bhagat – Teppy Raina cocktail. You do have a phenomenal memory. However, although nobody liked Raina, it’s fair to point out that he had a good record of his own. As you yourself pointed out, he had spunk and stood up to Indira when it was necessary. Also please remember that these were the increasingly psychopathic times that Indira went through, when she suspected everybody of conspiracy except that vile, abominable Heliogabalus in his aerobatic plane. So suspicion of Manekshaw, although by then, she couldn’t touch him, extended to suspicion of Prem Bhagat, who was streets ahead of the other contenders (you know that he was a Sapper? Strange that he was so well-liked; usually, it’s the Infantry and Cavalry glamour boys who are popular, with an occasional Gunner).
However, my remark about only good generals being promoted was carefully tailored to include chiefs of staff; there were one or two ‘mistakes’ at lower level, though not at the level of Kaul. Meaning not at the level of being wrong as in the case of Kaul. I really have to be careful since I still don’t know who you are, and sometimes you demonstrate a striking knowledge of inside information and what was on the grapevine. If you won’t divulge your identity, can you at least assure me that your name isn’t Thapar. At that time, the Army Commander and I think the DMO were crocks. I squirm in shame and embarrassment when I think of them.
Prem Bhagat’s supersession was a shame, although as I said, that’s unfair to Teppy Raina.There was some loose talk, but I think Raina’s performance in Bangladesh was a sufficient corrective.
About Harbaksh and Manekshaw, it was touch and go. Harbaksh rallied the forces at Chhamb, got the situation under control just in time, and sent Muchu Chaudhuri back to Delhi with a flea in his ear for suggesting a strategic retreat. If I remember correctly, one mistake was giving Niranjan Prasad such a long rope, and waiting so patiently for him to rally.
Nobody knew until the last moment. Even Manekshaw thought it was not in the bag, until the official declaration; this from personal knowledge of a first hand observer.
Regarding Bangladesh, having watched both Jagjit Aurora and Jake Jacob from very close quarters (as also the DNI
), you should cut Aurora some slack. While it is true that Jake was smarter and brainier and so on, and the whole eastern strategy was thought through by him, and he deserves all the praise for that, for higher command, one also considers personal stability. Dare one suggest, without being sly, that General Aurora had complementary qualities?
I was astonished that you remembered B. C. Nanda; it was so long ago.
And no, I can’t throw any light on Arjan Singh’s age; only two people know the secret, neither of them the Marshal himself, and one of them is a holy book.
A petulant note: you have been very mean to me about smoking things and responding. I did point out clearly that a Colonels’ coup was unlikely because they were too junior, and a Generals’ coup was unlikely because they’d been smoothed by the system, and angular awkward soldiers ejected.
Finally considering the state of Delhi traffic, a lot of things fall into place, including why the powers that be keep the hub of military decision-making in Delhi; both the Mangla/Kharian and the Multan Divisions combined couldn’t get through rush hour traffic there and no self-respecting F16 pilot would take his precious bird into that stuff floating over Delhi. You have spotted the strategic element in the decision. Only the Pakistani Navy might have a chance, if they implement the Ganga Action Plan, that is.
July 5, 2009 at 10:29 pm
Not a Thapar, nor was my mother one. My knowledge or presumtion thereof should be taken as authentic unless proved otherwise, which does not mean that I am, or was, a journalist.
Indira’s suspicions were post Bangladesh rather those of the Roman Emperors you sometimes refer to. She believed in her ‘mission’ and her ‘divinity’. Had not Vajpayee compared her to Durga? In 1973 or thereabouts she was in no danger politically. Maneckshaw had blotted his copybook by claiming, in London of all places, that had he joined the Pak Army it was India that would have been defeated in 1971. That almost lost him his Field Marshall ship. Can one believe his claim that he addressed her, on occasion, as ’sweety’. If he did there must have been more to it than merit in his elevation to the top job. By most accounts he was a careful man, not at all resembling the flamboyant image he cultivated. But Bangladesh must have gotten to his head. He was Eastern Army Commander in 1969 wasn’t he.
About Arjan’s Singh’s age surely you mean only two persons knew his age. The holy book being inanimate. Arjan Singh looks about 80 anyway; for a centenerian that is a credit in itself. What is the Airforce up to?
I apologize re: the smoking. I thought you had been afflicted with patriotism.
July 5, 2009 at 10:58 pm
@hayyer48
Very briefly, your insight and inside knowledge is a little disconcerting. That is why I feared that you might be a journalist. Inder Malhotra, for instance, would have known each and every insider fact that you have talked about so far. He was also personally friendly with many of them that you spoke about. Be that as it may.
Manekshaw habitually called people ’sweety’, including males. There has never been any question of his sexual orientation in spite of this disconcerting habit. I absolutely refuse to believe that he had the temerity to call Indira Gandhi sweety. That lady had her own very abrupt ways of cutting people to size, including getting up in the middle of a conversation taking an undesirable turn and sweeping out without another word. There is absolutely no reason to believe that there was anything more between them than, initially, a professional relationship of trust and respect. Some key intelligence officers in the know were mystified by this insinuation, whereas there were other stories – there was another story – that made them look away with their best Mk III poker faces on.
Another exception was my father; they were friendly, even close, especially due to their professional association during the General’s Eastern Command days, when the Army helped the cordon-and-search operations that broke the Naxals in Calcutta. They fell out when Manekshaw made a gratuitous negative report at a crucial moment when promotion was involved, although as it happened, there was no effect of his bad chit. Another exception was P. C. Lal; nobody messed with that man. However, many general officers, including those of other services, suffered from this peculiar mocking habit of his.
About Arjan Singh’s age, I was joking; I did mean the book was one of the two who knew, the other being (possibly) the Almighty. He has had nothing to do with the Air Force, and the Air Force has had nothing to do with him for some years now.
July 5, 2009 at 11:28 pm
Bonobashi:
A petulant note: you have been very mean to me about smoking things and responding.
……………………….
Then it must either be exhaustion or that YLH caught you very off guard when he started the coup discussion since I am amazed that while you discussed coups all around Asia and even Africa there was not a whisper about the men in fatigues next door. What do you think of the coup making qualities of the fellow Bengalis?
Regarding India I agree it is the diveresity of the ranks and the officer corps that makes it unlikely for them to close ranks against the politicians.
Hayyer; When talking about the scandal of an air marshall and the secretary did you by any chance mean PP Singh when you mentioned MM Singh?
Regards.
July 5, 2009 at 11:56 pm
@Gorki
Aw, c’mon, you don’t expect me to know everything, do you?
Quote :
/bonobashi
July 5, 2009 at 7:05 pm/
Are there any other nations in the vicinity with Generals leading coups? No names come to mind readily
Unquote
July 6, 2009 at 7:01 am
Bonobashi:
My apologies.
Being able to read gentle yet subtle sarcasm does not come easily to everyone.
.
I get it now though and stand corrected.
July 6, 2009 at 1:46 pm
Gorki: I meant MM Singh. Had he done the honourable thing in time with Gayatri they could not have superseded him.
July 6, 2009 at 2:22 pm
Islam is not the reason why Pakistan has had military rule if that was the case there is no reason why we shud have military rules in non-Muslim countries. Nor is it Punjabiyat and Pushtooniyat, if that was the case, BD wudnt have been coup free as Gorki points out.
The real issue is strict imposition of civilian supremacy over armed forces. And INC has to be given credit for that. INC was absolutely ruthless in ensuring its political supremacy over India but one beneficial by-product of that was that the INC HC (by extension the GOI) kept the armed forces under strict control. This is often attributed to JLN but in all fairness Patel too needs to be given some credit- ruthlessness was inbuilt into the INC DNA more perhaps by him that JLN or MKG.
And they showed this quite early by refusing to allow the INA haraamkhors to return to the Indian Army- JLN may have exercised his (non-existent) legal skills to fight on the officers behalf but post independence didnt allow these folks to come back- he must have foreseen the trouble these guys wud have caused.
Which brings me to the next point. If Akbar Khan invaded Kashmir without the approval of MAJ (pbuh) and LAK, why wasn’t he courtmartialled and hung for insubordination and involving Pakistan in a war. The refusal to do so may well have sowed the seeds of Bonapartism in Pak Army. Wonder how Yasser Pai will now extricate MAJ (pbuh) on this?
Btw, if Akbar Khan had MAJ’s approval in my opinion then of course all this is kosher and besides the point- the “invasion” was a war of liberation in my opinion, marred only by an act of indiscipline (in Baramulla) which ruined the whole project.
Regards
July 7, 2009 at 3:29 am
majumdar
what do you think would have been the result of courtmartialling him in the middle of the ongoing war? karachi was trying to invent/construct a state from scratch, unlike n.delhi which had experienced little more than a change of management of a going concern – a full, running centre. pak only had it’s share of the british military and bureaucrats (not a full bureaucracy since karachi had never before been a centre). jinnah died before the official ceasefire. it took the bigger bonaparte – ayub khan – to take care of the smaller one, first chance he got…. albeit thinking more of his own ‘long’ term interests than those of LAK or the political govt’s.
July 7, 2009 at 7:21 am
@Majumdar, BC
Look up this incident in PAVO Cavalry’s blog; it’s fascinating. All the pieces are described, and their fitting together explained. He has a clear explanation of Akbar Khan’s role, also that of Liaqat Ali’s and Jinnah’s (a bit overboard in praise of Jinnah, but that’s all right, one such person per site is fine
); describes the composition of the irregulars, including the people from the Dogra Maharaja’s troops who turned coat, the Afghan lashkars, and the auxiliary help from ex-servicemen de-mobbed, the role of Gracey and Messervy, the role of Bucher, and the involvement of Indian politicians.
I was thrilled reading it and seeing how the entire mosaic was put together.
Of course, there was a lot of statesmanship and real-politik, like there is here, and everywhere else Kashmir I is described; what is a few women raped in the face of high matters of state, after all. Sometimes I feel that that aspect is again and again turned away and trivialised by us all, and it is my horror at this aspect that makes me advocate that we in India give the residents of the Vale the plebiscite and act on it. Nothing is worth sacrificing a single woman’s honour and life. That’s the bottom line.
July 7, 2009 at 8:58 am
Civvie,
what do you think would have been the result of courtmartialling him in the middle of the ongoing war?
Surely Akbar Khan cud have been tried after the war was over. If what I have read is correct, the guy continued to indulge in matters which shud have been of no concern to a soldier and Pakistan’s inability to put an end to this paved the way for army interference.
Regards
July 7, 2009 at 10:42 am
Rationality is over rated. After the fact, rationality comes to play. America should not have fought the Vietnam War, Pakistan blundered by creating mujahids against USSR, India should have stayed out of Tamils problem in Srilanka; Sikhs should have stayed neural in Punjab. The examples of stupidity are endless but it is in the nature of state to be. It is obvious to even an average person that America is in no position to impose their will on Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are willing to bet their economy to win.
What do you call rationality when you mix it with power politics?
Is it rational for Israel to attack Iran?
Is it rational for India to start a cold war with China?
Is it rational for Pakistan to attack places where Taliban get support?
July 7, 2009 at 1:04 pm
majumdar
akbar khan was courtmartialled… but for an attempted coup. anyone even remotely connected to communism was taken care of in the same sweep. there was a palpable ‘ideological’ coup if you read the media from those days. jinnah was not there after sep 48.
as an aside to akbar khan + his INA friends: could a state, not quite in place yet, take on the forerunners of the Taliban marching on to kashmir.. with or without pak’s share of military equipment still not released by india? the fakir of ipi insurgency was on, with a’stan (and india?)sponsoring and KK supporting him. indeed, the mehsuds while in kashmir were not available to the fakir to be recruited in to his insurgency.
bonobashi
i’ll go and read amin’s blog, once i’ve been able to disregard his ‘ahmedi heavy forum’ comment.
July 7, 2009 at 1:22 pm
Civvie,
could a state, not quite in place yet, take on the forerunners of the Taliban marching on to kashmir
The question is who invited the proto-Taliban into Kashmir in the first place.
If the proto-Taliban were in Kashmir at the behest of the top Pakistani leadership then not only was it a masterstroke (albeit spoiled by the tribesman fondness for the things of life) but also a justified war of liberation.
But if not, the GOP should have prosecuted Akbar Khan and the rest of the gang once the war was over in June 1948 Surely, by end 1948 GOP wud have been strong enuff to prosecute Akbar Khan and the rest if they had flouted the Pak HC?
indeed, the mehsuds while in kashmir were not available to the fakir to be recruited in to his insurgency.
This is quite interesting and illustrative. The best option that Pakistan has of keeping the unruly tribesmen of the NWFP under control, whether today or in 1947, was to pack them off to India or A’stan.
For that reason you shud keep praying that the issue of Kashmir never gets sorted out!!!
Regards
July 7, 2009 at 1:23 pm
anyone even remotely connected to communism was taken care of in the same sweep
That was a very sensible thing to do.
Regards
July 7, 2009 at 2:00 pm
majumdar
the official ceasefire did not come in to force until 1 jan 1949. as for jinnah’s successors, to quote cowasjee, “jinnah ke baad sub charya log thha”.
pak did get on top of the fakir of ipi troubles (effectively by 1954(or was it 56, but before the fakir’s actual death in 63 or something)). it had ample opportunity to reform/develop the areas until 1979… when zia decided to turn them in to a ‘lab’ (even worse than the ’suspended animation’ practiced by the brits).
July 7, 2009 at 2:11 pm
For that reason you shud keep praying that the issue of Kashmir never gets sorted out!!!
except the proto-taliban have not just broken out of the labs, but in control of the very labs that manufactured them. indeed the ‘labs’ have moved to muridke and bahawalpur, for example. pak is not iran when it comes to professionally managing these things. E.g. iran kept afghan refugees coralled in barbed wire. they couldn’t dream of entering tehran, while they own half of peshawar.